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The current discussion about possible removal of high executive offi-
cials has revealed a general lack of knowledge concerning the origin,
scope, and machinery of impeachment. Raoul Berger's Impeachment:
The Constitutional Problems does much to clarify this relatively unfa-
miliar procedure through an analysis of the historical antecedents of
American impeachment. While the volume is based primarily upon Ber-
ger's law review articles, the analysis is integrated and it reads smoothly.
The narrative has been carefully researched and footnoted, and Berger
has demonstrated the same mastery of historical materials and unique
insight that characterized his earlier study of relations between Con-
gress and the Supreme Court.' The book, then, is a historical treatment
of the origin and evolution of impeachment, and it is not structured to
serve as a treatise on impeachment law and procedure per se.
Impeachment came into significant usage during the 14th Century
in England, at which time it represented but one of several devices em-
ployed to remove offending judges and ministers. The most expedient
method then available was for the king to simply revoke the patent of
an offending judge, since judges held their office at the pleasure of the
crown. This was changed by the Act of Settlement in 1700, which es-
tablished that judges served "during good behavior."2
A second device, the bill of attainder, was employed against public
ministers,3 and required a legislative determination of treason and the
imposition of punishment. As Parliament sought to develop devices to
limit royal prerogatives, these two instruments proved insufficient. Thus a
practice referred to as the Address of Parliament developed, whereby both
Houses passed an act requiring the removal of an offending officeholder.
Removal might be for whatever cause Parliament chose to specify, but
since there was no way that the king could be compelled to comply
with the Address, other than to recognize that a question of confidence
was involved, this device too proved not completely effective.4
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i. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
2 See Gallo, Removal of Federal Judges-New Alternatives to an Old Problem.: Chandler
v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1385, 1391 (1966).
3 For a complete discussion of attainder, see Z. CHAPEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN TII
CONSTITUTION 90-161 (1956).
4 But see Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges. A Study of the Constitutional Provisiony,
39 FoRDmi L. REv. 1, 12, n.59 (1970), asserting that the king was "bound by convention
to comply with the request."
BOOK REVIEWS
Impeachment ultimately evolved as the most potent device to make
the king's ministers as well as his judges accountable to Parliament. Since
the king could, in theory, do no wrong, the power to remove his erring
subordinates became a significant element in combating royal absolutism.
Under English procedure Parliament had virtually unlimited authority
to declare whatever behavior it chose the basis for removal. Moreover, as
had been the case with the bill of attainder, the assent of the king was
not necessary. English impeachment not only sought removal of the
offender from office, but the Lords also imposed severe criminal penalties
for conduct found to be impeachable.
The American framers were also concerned about the possible con-
centration of excessive executive power, but they specifically rejected all
the English devices with the exception of impeachment.5 In addition
they carefully restricted the availability of impeachment. First, the Con-
stitution limited impeachable offenses to treason, bribery, and "high
crimes and misdemeanors"; and second, the scope of congressional power
was confined to removal (and possible disqualification from holding fu-
ture office) and did not include the infliction of criminal punishment.
One of the most ambiguous aspects of impeachment is the nature
6f the offense, "high crimes and misdemeanors." Two key issues consti-
tute the main points of contention. First, does the phrase limit impeach-
able offenses to indictable crimes? Second, if impeachment is not con-
fined to crimes, what are the ascertainable limits of the offense? The
argument that only criminal offenses can serve as justification for im-
peachment has been made extensively by counsel representing judges dur-
ing impeachment proceedings.7  Berger demonstrates through an exami-
nation of the use of the identical phase in English impeachment pro-
ceedings, that certain non-indictable offenses also provided the basis for
impeachment: misapplication of funds, abuse of official power, neglect
of duty, and encroachments upon or acts in contempt of legislative pre-
5 It is interesting to note that in 1805, during the Jeffersonian-Federalist squabble over the
courts, John Randolph introduced a proposal to amend the Constitution in order to provide
for a device similar to the Address, but the proposal met with little support and was rejected.
See I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 295-96 (1926). A
similar proposal calling for joint removal by two-thirds of both houses was introduced and
defeated in 1905. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HiST. R V. 485,
507 (1949).
6Treason and bribery are also listed as grounds for impeachment in article If, section 4, of
the Constitution, but their meanings are reasonably precise. Treason is defined with particu-
larity in the Constitution itself (article III, section 3, clause 1), while bribery draws its content
from common and statutory law.
7 See Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, in IMPEAcHMNr: SELECTED MATE-
RIALS 663, 664 n.7 (1973). See also Brown, The Impeachment of the Federal Judiciary, 26
HARV. L. RFV. 684, 689, n.5 (1913).
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rogatives.8 Indeed Berger argues that any type of activity which seriously
destroyed confidence in governing officials could properly serve as the
basis for an impeachment proceeding. Impeachment could not, however,
be based on activities occurring before the assumption of office.
The great majority of law review commentators share Berger's con-
clusion that indictable offenses are not necessary to bring an impeach-
ment proceeding. The use of the term misdemeanors would be super-
fluous if impeachment required an indictable offense, since crimes would
encompass misdemeanors as wellY Furthermore, the exception from both
the executive pardoning power (article II, § 2) and the original provision
guaranteeing a jury trial in criminal cases (article III, § 2, clause 3)
does not indicate that impeachments were to be limited to crimes. It
only demonstrates that some acts might jointly constitute crimes and im.
peachable offenses. In addition, an examination of the actual instances
of impeachment in American history provides support for the proposition
that "the misconduct may, but need not, amount to a violation of law,' 1
If "high crimes and misdemeanors" are not confined to criminal of-
fenses, may Congress impeach for whatever reason it chooses? This po-
sition was advocated by Gerald Ford when he initiated a 1970 investi-
gation of Justice Douglas. In an April 15, 1970 speech the then House
minority leader declared that "an impeachable offense is whatever a ma-
jority of the Jouse of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given mo-
ment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two.
thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require
removal of the accused from office."" Berger strenuously rejects this
view and maintains that the common law definition does indicate ascer-
tainable limits to the scope of impeachment, for offenses not constituting
crimes. History is his primary guide for establishihg the parameters of
activity constituting an impeachable offense.'2 Hence Berger concludes
8Also see, Feerick, supra note 4, at 49-5 1.
0 Gallo, supra note 2, at 1387-88.
10 Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Oflcers Under the Federal Constitution, in IMPIIAClI-
MENT: SELECTED MATERIALS 689, 695 (1973). A convenient and current summary of the
eight completed judicial impeachments is found in Thompson and Pollitt, Imprachmeto of
Federal Judges: An Historical Overview, 49 N. C. L. REV. 8', 92-107 (1970) . For an carlier
discussion see Ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachment Since 1903,
23 MINN. L REV. 185 (1938).
11 Quoted in COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REP. 91ST CON,, 2D SISS. ASSo-
CIATE JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS: FINAL REPORT BY T11E SPECIAL SUICOMMITrEE ON
H. RES. 920-36 (Comm. Print 1970).
12 For example, the unsuccessful impeachment of Justice Chase has often been cited to es.
tablish the proposition that mere differences of political or legal philosophy arc not suflicient
grounds for removal. See R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 96-107 (1971).
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that although the founders sought to place limits upon presidential au-
thority by providing for a removal mechanism, it was intended that such
a mechanism should only be invoked for serious acts of misconduct. Be-
cause the repercussions of executive removal would be shattering, the
alleged misconduct had to be substantial to warrant the utilization of the
impeachment procedure. Furthermore by requiring serious misconduct
the potential for congressional abuse of the impeachment device was
limited.
The analysis becomes more complex, however, when dealing with
judges, since they hold tenure "during good behavior," which is seeming-
ly a less stringent standard than "high crimes and misdemeanors."' In
addition, the removal of a judge would not produce the serious ramifica-
tions that presidential impeachment would generate. The difficulty in
identifying judicial conduct, which, while not criminal, still constitutes
grounds for impeachment was evident in the impeachment of District
Judge Ritter in 1936.14 The articles of impeachment drawn up against
Ritter included seven counts; the first six alleged various criminal actions
(tax evasion, conspiracy, accepting illegal compensation, etc.) sufficient
to demonstrate "high crimes and misdemeanors." The judge was not
convicted on any of these six counts, but was held liable under a seventh
article, which alleged that Ritter was guilty of a "high crime and misde-
meanor" because his behavior "would prejudice the public view of the
court's fairness."' 5
The Ritter case has been cited for the "principle that even though
upon specific charges amounting to legal violations, the impeaching body
finds the accused not guilty, it may, nevertheless, find that his conduct
in these very matters was such as to bring his office into disrepute and
order his removal on that ground."' " This position would certainly com-
port with ethical concepts of the judicial role which demand that a judge
must avoid even the appearance of impropriety. 1'7 Ritter's impeachment
and conviction is the most extreme example of judicial removal absent
proof of criminal activity to be found in American precedents, but even
13 Fenton argues that the use of the term "misbehavior" in the four articles of judicial
impeachment drawn since 1905 indicates a recent "reliance on the judicial tenure dause as an
impeachment standard." Fenton, supra note 7, at 666.
14 H.R. Res. 422, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) quoted in IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED AMA-
TERIALS 188 (1973).
15 Feerick, .supra note 4, at 46.
16 Yankwich, supra note 10, at 697.
17 For some judicial perceptions of this "Ceasar's wife" orientation, see H. GuC1, Su-
P'R m COURTS IN STATE PoLrrcs 60-61 (1971). It is doubtful whether this same fluid
standard could be applied to the impeachment of executive officials.
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'here a substantial body of criminal activity was alleged, although not
proven to the satisfaction of two-thirds of the Snate. Hence even the
conviction of Judge Ritter does not seriously weaken Berger's argument
that American history does not provide the basis for an open-ended im.
peaching power.
As an alternative to the impeachment of judges Berger suggests a
procedure similar to the old common law writ of scire facias, whereby
a special judicial court including judges from the District, Appeals, and
Supreme Court would evaluate charges of misbehavior filed by an investi-
gative branch of the administrative office of courts or the judiciary depart-
ment itself. If the charges were sustained to the satisfaction of the com-
posite court, the judicial office would then be forfeited. Such proposals
have been periodically introduced in the form of congressional bills, the
most recent example being the Tydings plan offered in 1966.18
Berger and his most influential predecessor, Burke Shartel10 provide
several arguments in support of the constitutionality of such a procedure,
without the necessity of a constitutional amendment. First, there is his-
torical procedent. English judges after the Act of Settlement (1700)
served "during good behavior" just as their American counterparts do
today. There were two ways in which a judge could be removed. When
Parliament impeached it alleged "high crimes and misdemeanors." Ber-
ger states that never "did an English impeachment charge a breach of
'good behavior'; instead the stock charges were 'high treason and other
high crimes and misdemeanors.' "120 Such an action, if successful, not
only removed the offending judge but imposed criminal punishment as
well. Lesser offenses, termed "misconduct," could be reached through
a civil judicial proceeding-scire facias-which if successful resulted
merely in a forfeiture of office. On the basis of this precedent Berger
argues that if impeachment constitutes the sole method of judicial re-
moval under the Constitution, a range of offenses lie beyond the reach
18 See Tydings, The Congress and the Courts. Helping the Judiciary to Help Itsel, 52
A.B.A.J. 321 (1966). The proposal is comprehensively discus:ed in Holloman, The Judicial
Reform Act: History, Analysis and Comment, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 128 (1970).
Similar bills were introduced in 1937, Note, Removal of Federal Judges: A Proposed Plan,
31 ILL. L. REv. 631 (1937), 1940 Comment, Courts-Judicial Reskonsibility-Statutory
and Constitutional Problems Related to Methods for Removal or Discipline of Judges, 21
RuTGERS L. REV. 153, 162 (1966), and 1942 Comment, Judicial Trial and Removal of Ped.
eral Judges: H.R. 146, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 352 (1942). See generally Note, Removal of Fed-
eral Judges-Alternatives to Impeachment, 20 VAND. L. REV. 723, 727 (1967).
19 Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Remotal-Some Possibilitios
Under the Constitution, (pts. 1-3) 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 723, 870 (1930). Shartel's argu-
ment is the most influential attack upon the concept of judges being removed solely via im-
peachment, and it is the one universally cited and relied upon in the more recent literature.
20 R. BERGER, 125 (1972).
(Vol. 35
BOOK REVIEWS
of correction. These lesser offenses can not be touched if they do not
establish "high crimes and misdemeanors," yet in the parent British sys-
tem they could be dealt with by the invocation of scire facias.2' Hence,
the language of article III stating that judges shall serve "during good
behavior," Berger concludes, was meant to convey this second method
of judicial removal. 22 Furthermore, "If the impeachment clause immedi-
pately followed the good behavior clause in article III, there would be
warrant for claiming this was intended as a complete exposition of the
tenure and removal of federal judges, but such is not the case.' '2
Berger argues that scire facias was not used in the colonies simply
because colonial judges were appointed by the king and removable at
his pleasure. In the early state constitutions, however, there was no con-
sensus on judges being removable solely by impeachment,2 4 in fact, half
of the states provided for removal by address. Nevertheless, Berger is
unable to cite any instance of the actual utilization of scire facias in
American experience, nor was any proposal made at the ratifying conven-
tion for any such type of instrument.25
Even if scire facias was never adopted, Berger maintains that there
have been instances when Congress at least tacitly recognized that it was
constitutionally permissible to remove judges by means other than im-
peachment. For example, in 1790 the first Congress, which included
many of the key participants in the Constitutional Convention, passed
a criminal statute which provided that judges who were convicted of brib-
ery were subject to fine, imprisonment, "and shall forever be disquali-
fied to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United
States."26  Hence impeachment was not recognized as the sole method
21 See Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional, 7 U. KAN. C1TY L REV. 3 (1938).
22 The counter-argument is that in English experience the phrase "during good behavior"
was used as a reference to the concept of lifetime tenure. Fenton, supra, note 7 at 666; Kramer
and Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal and Mandatory Retirement Procedures for the
Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of "During Good Behavior," 35 GEO. WASH. L RE". 455,
459 (1967).
2 3Note, Removal of Federal Judges: A Proposed Plan, 31 ILL. L REV. 631, 639 (1937).
2 4 Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Prece-
dents, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 135.
25 The Federalist Papers specifically reject alternative methods of removal, deciding that
impeachment "is the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary inde-
pendence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own constitution
in respect to our own judges." A HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIst NO. 79, at 493 (H. Lodge
ed. 1888). But see Davis, The Chandler Incident and Problems of Judicial Removal, 19
STAN. L REV. 448, 463 (1967).
26 11 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 2219-20 (1834). For an argument that this act constituted
an alternative way to remove a judge and hence the recognition that impeachment was not the
only method of removal see Davis, supra note 25, at 460. But see Shepley, Legislative Con-
irol of Judicial Behavior, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 178, 200 n.104 (1970): "It is no
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for judicial removal. The weakness in this analysis is that the statute
has never been enforced against judges. Moreover, at virtually the same
time as the statute was under consideration, various congressional debates
occurred in which impeachment was specifically recognized as the only
method for removal of judges.
From a fundamental standpoint, Berger maintains that the institution
of scire facias is compatible with the constitutional separation of powers,
and that the independence of the judiciary is not threatened, since judges
would be overseeing other judges.28  The proposed panel of judges could
be expected to possess at once not only the expertise to evaluate the
more shadowy offenses constituting judicial misbehavior but also a vested
interest in assuring that judicial removal would be only for sufficient
cause.
There has been a very limited procedure for the removal or quasi-
removal of a federal judge in existence for ten years. In 1964 Congress
enacted a procedure whereby a district or circuit judge who is mentally
or physically disabled, and who, while eligible to retire refuses to do
so, can be certified as disabled by a majority vote of his judicial council,
This certification is submitted to the Pfesident, who may then appoint
another judge (subject to Senate confirmation) to take over the business
of the disabled judge. The disabled judge continues to serve, albeit with
no business. 0 Since the procedure involves minimal legislative and ex-
ecutive involvement, the key actor being the council, this procedure-
as unwieldy as is the result-seems to avoid infringement on the separa-
tion of powers. But one may inquire, if judges could be removed other
than by impeachment, why did Congress enact the complicated certifica-
tion procedure?
The constitutionality of even a very limited removal procedure has
been debated, and it originally appeared that a resolution of that issue
might be forthcoming from the Supreme Court in the recent case of
Chandler v. judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit.0 In 1965, the Judi.
doubt unconstitutional unless invoked after convicting a judge by the Senate on impeachment
by the House."
2 7 Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CoNTMP. PROD. 108,
118 (1970).
28 According to Senator Sam Ervin, however, judicial independence has a broader mean-
ing. Ervin defines judicial independence as being "free from outside influence of whatever
kind and from whatever source," and this means equally "that each individual judge would be
free from coercion even from his own brethren." Ervin, supra note 27, at 121.
29 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1970). Kramer and Barron, supra note 22, at 463.
30 398 U.S. 74 (1970). The asserted statutory basis for Chandler's removal is found In
28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970): "Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the ef.
fective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit. Th
district judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council."
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cial Council of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, consisting of all ap-
peals judges for that circuit, found Judge Chandler either unable or un-
willing to discharge the responsibilities of his district judgeship. There-
upon it ordered Chandler to take no further action on any pending or
future cases and, by the same order, reassigned his cases to other judges.
In Chandler's initial appeal to the Supreme Court, that body refused to
render a decision because the Council's order was only interlocutory, since
at a later point the judge would be allowed to appear with counsel before
the Council prior to final determination. Justices Black and Douglas,
however, in a dissenting opinion, declared the removal unconstitutional,
because the only body with the power of removal was the Senate via
impeachment proceedings."' Following this initial defeat, Chandler ap-
parently indicated to his fellow district judges that he assented to their
taking over his new cases, but that he wanted to continue handling the
cases already filed in his court. Chandler also refused an opportunity
for a hearing before the Council, and eventually again sought Supreme
Court review. With Justices Black and Douglas dissenting, the Supreme
Court again refused to rule on the constitutionality of the removal proce-
dure employed against Chandler-in this instance because he had not
exhausted the remedies provided by the Council. 2
A vast amount of serious study has been devoted to the question
whether or not impeachment is the sole method for the removal of
judges.33 The only unassailable conclusion is that the issue is so plagued
with doubt that as a matter of wisdom any institution of a plan such
as Berger has proposed must come about through consititutional amend-
ment.34
According to Berger's analysis, impeachment is a political action, not
a criminal proceeding, but one which must operate within the vague lim-
3 1 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Cir. 382 U.S. 1003, 1005-06 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
3 2 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Cir., 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
Although Chandlers removal was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970), there has also been
doubt expressed as to the constitutionality of using the statutory basis of 28 U.S.C. § 372(b)
to replace a judge who is not mentally or physically disabled but is nonetheless unable to
adequately fulfill his responsibilities, as was apparently the case in Chandler. See Comment,
Courts-udicial Responsibility-Statutory and Constitutional Problems Related to Methods
for Removal or Discipline of Judges, 21 RUTGERS L REV. 153, 163 (1966). The role of the
judicial councils in disciplining district judges is comprehensively discussed in P. FISH, THE
POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICAL ADMiNISTRATION 398-426 (1973).
33 For a counterweight to Berger's position by a noted constitutional authority see Kur-
land, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U.
Cmii. L REv. 665 (1969). It is a serious weakness in Berger's discussion that, although men.
tioning Kurland, he does not squarely seek to offset his historical analysis.
34 One suggestion is for a scire facias proposal within an amendment to deal with disability.
I. BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS & ERRORS 199 (1972).
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its of "high crimes and misdemeanors" and fairness of procedure. This
position raises the question of who is to enforce these limitations, and
Berger argues that the judiciary has the authority to review impeachment
proceedings. There is, of course, little historical support for such an
assertion and Berger is forced at this point to abandon historical prece-
dent and to rely on recent unrelated judicial decisions. He concludes
that the jurisdiction of the Court to review an impeachment to determine
if Congress acted within the constitutional boundaries of that procedure
is fundamentally no different than the jurisdiction which the Supreme
Court exercised in Powell v. McCormack," when it considered the pow-
er of Congress to expel one of its own member. Nor is impeachment
a political question in light of the criteria the Court developed in Baker
v. Carr. 6 Under Berger's scheme, Congress would retain the power to
initiate impeachment proceedings, which, if successful, would be tried in
the Senate, with the possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court. Cer-
tainly this procedure would strengthen the system of checks and balances,
although undoubtedly most such judicial reviews would be of judicial
and not of executive impeachments.
Nonetheless, Berger seems to have taken an indefensible position in
advocating judicial review of impeachments. There appear to be neither
parliamentary practices or common law precedents indicating that any
such review ever took place,8" and the Constitution itself provides no
means for review following a conviction by the Senate. 8  Furthermore,
the courts have specifically refused to exercise this power. After his im-
peachment, Judge Ritter sued for back salary, arguing that the Senate
had exceeded its jurisdiction in trying him for charges which did not
constitute criminal behavior and in finally removing him on the basis
of discrediting his court. The Court of Claims, in Ritter v, United
States,"0 refused to entertain the suit, explicitly stating that the Constitu-
tion gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Senate relative to impeachment.
Therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to inquire into any aspect of the
35 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Powell case demonstrates the Court's willingness to inject
itself into a dispute involving one of the most prized prerogatives of Congress, the power to
expel its own members. For extensive analyses of the case, see K. W3E3KS, ADAM CLAYTON
POWELL AND THE SUPREME COURT (1971), and P. DIONISOPOULOS, REIBELLION, RACISM,
AND REPRESENTATION: THE ADAM CLAYTON POWELL CASE AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
(1970).
36 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Court emphasized the availability of definable criteria
for decision and of an appropriate remedy in determining that it had jurisdiction in cases
involving reapportionment.
S7 Thomas, The Law of Impeachment in the United States, 2 AMER. POL, SCl, REV, 378,
393 (1908).
38 Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 803, 809 (1916).
30 84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937).
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impeachment process, including allegations that the Senate had exceeded
the constitutional limits of its impeachment power.40
Another proposal of Berger's contrary to traditional concepts of im-
peachment calls for the exercise of impeachment against members of
Congress. Berger finds some support for this position in English history,
since most English impeachments were undertaken against peers. Fur-
thermore, Berger cites scattered references in the state ratifying debates
indicating that impeachment of members of Congress was discussed,"
but the various references considered together are ambiguous at best. -
Even Berger concedes that the point appears to have been settled
with the impeachment of Senator Blount in 1797, and he frankly admits
that he is calling for a reconsideration of the issue. Blount was im-
peached after he had been expelled from the Senate. Counsel for Blount
argued successfully that Congress lacked jurisdiction because article II,
§ 4, of the Constitution limited impeachment to "the President, Vice-
President, and all civil officers of the United States;" that the term "civil
officers" was designed to exclude members of Congress,"3 and in any
event Blount was no longer a member of the Senate.44  Although this
congressional recognition that it lacked the power to impeach Blount has
been consistently cited in support of the proposition that Congress cannot
impeach its own members, a recent commentator has argued that the
actual issue resolved in the Blount proceeding concerned the impeacha-
bility of a private citizen. Hence the issue of impeaching members of
Congress was rather "casually disposed" away, a circumstance which
would add support to Berger's argument for reconsideration.45
Berger contends that if Congress is able to impeach its own members
40 There are, however, a few cases on the state level in which courts have acted as a board
of review for impeachments. Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the
Constitution, 51 HARV. L. REV. 330,330-31 (1937).
It is possible to distinguish an impeachment proceedings against a non-judicial officer from
the situation in Ritter. In Ritter and in any judicial impeachment it can be argued that judi-
cial review would terve to undermine a legislative check against judicial irresponsibility and
thus impede the system of checks and balances. Judicial review of the impeachment and con-
viction of an executive officer would not have this effect.
4 1J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, (2d ed. 1907) at I: 45, 168-69, 477; InI: 202, 307, 402,
661; IV: 265, 276.
42 J. ELLIOTT, supra note 41, at II: 219-20; IV: 33, 34, 124.
Feerickls analysis of the ratifying convention debates provides quotations indicating that
some participants dearly believed the susceptibility of members of Congress to regular crimi-
nal prosecution would be sufficient. Feerick, supra note 4, at 24-25.
43 See The Library of Congress (N. Small ed.) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 556 (1946): "A Member of Congress
is not a civil officer within the meaning" of the Impeachment Clauses.
44 C. BURDicK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTTUTION 86 (1922).
-5 L BRANT, supra note 34, at 37.
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its ethical standards would be raised. The difficulty with this argument
is that Congress already has the power to expel or punish its own mem-
bers by a two-thirds vote. Since the expulsion procedure is far less cum-
bersome and time-consuming than impeachment, if it is not sufficient, the
device of impeachment seems unlikely to offer much of a remedy.
Berger strikes this reviewer as deficient in the slight attention he de-
votes to reforms of the impeachment mechanism. Although some com-
mentators argue that the present device has worked well, if only in forc-
ing some judges to retire for fear of conviction, 0 the general consensus
of opinion is that the mechanism requires some substantial modifications.
One commentator has suggested the following changes: "(1) Creation
of a bipartisan House Committee on Judicial Fitness; (2) creation of
a permanent professional staff as an adjunct to the Committee; (3) use of
a master or masters to conduct formal evidentiary hearings for the Senate
and to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which
would be the basis of argument and decision in the Senate." 4'
The key defects in the volume pertain to the author's focus and em-
phasis. For example, the in-depth case studies of the impeachment of
Chase and Johnson cover material already abundantly analyzed by
others.48  Moreover, Berger's focus within the case studies is at times
inadequate, such as his concern with the constitutionality of the Tenure
of Office Act in Johnson's trial, rather than with the impeachment process
itself. Furthermore, Berger's infatuation with history often leads him
to devote an excessive amount of space to cerrtain tangential points: his
forty-three page chapter on retrospective treason being a prime example.
Nonetheless, these blemishes do not seriously detract from the superior
scholarship, exhaustive research, and explicit prose which are evident in
every aspect of the volume. Any discussion of impeachment to come
must certainly benefit from Berger's analytical framework. Though im-
peachment will probably remain an unusual constitutional operation,
there is no excuse after this fine book for it to remain a mysterious one,
46 See Thompson and Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal judges: An Historical Overview, 49
N. C. L. REV. 87, 118-21 (1970).
47 Stolz, Disciplining Federal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CAL. L REV, 659,
667 (1969).
4 8 See, e.g.,, M. BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND RIAL O ANDREW JOHNSON
(1972).
